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Chapter One 
COMPLEMENTARY, SUPPLEMENTARY, OR 
ADVERSARIAL? A THEORETICAL AND 
HISTORICAL EXAMINATION OF 
NONPROFIT-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
Dennis R. Young 
INTRODUCTION 
From time to time, public policymakers in the United States take an 
oversimplified view of the nonprofit sector and its relationship with 
government. In the 1980s, the Reagan administration argued that, as 
government cut back on its expenditures for public services, the non­
profit sector would simply fill the vacuum through volunteer effort 
and charitable contributions (Bremner 1988; Salamon 1995). In the 
1990s, House Speaker Newt Gingrich expressed a similar view 
through his program Contract with America (U.S. Congress 1995), 
while members of Congress proposed the Istook amendment, which 
would have curtailed lobbying by nonprofit organizations receiving 
federal funds. According to these perspectives, nonprofits were sim­
ply service organizations, capable of running on voluntary resources 
and with no legitimate role in public policy formation. 
The left has made similar errors of oversimplification that have 
disparaged private philanthropy and implicitly extolled governmental 
solutions to public needs: 
Philanthropy remained in bad repute in liberal and radical circles 
throughout the 1930s.... Eduard C. Lindeman ... whose Wealth and 
Culture (1936) was a study of the operation of one hundred foundations 
during the 1920s, offered an economic interpretation of modern philan­
thropy: it was disintegrating capitalism's way of distributing, in its 
own interests, wealth which could not be spent on luxuries, was not 
needed for reinvestment, and could not profitably be employed for 
speculation. Foundations. and by implication, all large-scale benefac­
tions. denoted the development of a rudimentary social consciousness 
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in the donors, but they also represented the donors' determination to 
control social thought and expression (Bremner 1988, 152). 
The reality of government-nonprofit sector relations in the United 
States is far richer and more complex than such one-dimensional 
views suggest. Nonprofit organizations interact with government in 
several different ways; these patterns of interaction vary over time and 
among different fields of service. In various contexts, nonprofits have 
served as privately supported supplementary service providers of pub­
lic goods, as complementary partners with government in public ser­
vice provision, and as advocates and adversaries in the process of 
public policy formulation and implementation. Often, two or three of 
these roles are manifested simultaneously. 
In this chapter, we trace the historical evolution of these three 
modes of government-nonprofit relations. Various strands of economic 
theory pertaining to nonprofit organizations illuminate the circulIl­
stances under which we can expect nonprofits to fulfill different roles 
vis-a.-vis government-supplementary, complementary, and adversar­
ial. These three theoretical modes of government-nonprofit relation­
ships are first explained and then applied as conceptual screens for 
examining the history of government-nonprofit sector relationships 
in the United States, from colonial times to the present. Each theoret­
ical cut reveals new insights into the complex of relationships be­
tween nonprofits and government, and no single view provides a full 
understanding. 
Finally, we consider how the alternative views of government­
nonprofit relations can inform the present debate on the roles of 
government, nonprofits , and business in the United States. Recent 
developments, including governmental retrenchment and devolution, 
privatization of public services, restructuring in the business sector, 
and commercialization in the nonprofit sector, have dislocated extant 
patterns of government-nonprofit sector relationships. Government 
no longer takes comprehensive responsibility for social welfare; cor­
porations have become more narrowly strategic in their philanthropic 
programs; substantial new private wealth has been created among 
business entrepreneurs; and nonprofits have become more competi­
tive and market-oriented in their quests to remain financially viable 
and to address growing social needs. This shuffling of institutional 
conditions leaves open to question how the sectors will continue to 
divide responsibilities and work together to solve social problems and 
meet public needs in the future. Our review of the history of govern­
ment-nonprofit relations through the three theoretical lenses suggests 
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that a new "social contract" between government, nonprofits, and 
business must emerge if public needs are to be met. 
STRANDS OF THEORY 
Different strands of economic theory support alternative notions of 
the nonprofit sector as supplementary, complementary, or adversarial 
to government. (This taxonomy is similar to that postulated by Najam 
(1997) for relations between government and nongovernmental orga­
nizations internationally.) In the supplementarymodel, nonprofits are 
seen as fulfilling demand for public goods left unsatisfied by govern­
ment. In this view, the private financing of public goods can be ex­
pected to have an inverse relationship with government expenditure. 
As government takes more responsibility for provision, less needs to 
be raised through voluntary collective means. 
In the complementary view, nonprofits are seen as partners to gov­
ernment, helping to deliver public goods largely financed by govern­
ment. In this perspective, nonprofit and government expenditures 
have a direct relationship with one another. As government expendi­
tures increase, they help finance rising levels of nonprofit activity. 
In the adversarial view, nonprofits prod government to make 
changes in public policy and to maintain accountability to the public. 
Reciprocally, government attempts to influence the behavior of non­
profit organizations, by regulating their services and responding to 
their advocacy initiatives as well. The adversarial view does not posit 
any specific relationship between the levels of nonprofit and govern­
mental activity. For example, nonprofits can advocate for smaller or 
more efficient government operations, or they can advocate for new 
programs and regulations that would increase government activity. 
The three perspectives are by no means mutually exclusive. Non­
profits may simultaneously finance and deliver services where govern­
ment does not, deliver services that are financed or otherwise assisted 
by government, advocate for changes in government policies and prac­
tices, and be affected by governmental pressure and oversight. For 
example, Kramer (1981) observed that nonprofits' reliance on public 
funds to deliver services did not necessarily constrain their advocacy 
activity. 
Moreover, while the three views frame our discussion of nonprofit­
government relations as if nonprofits and government were distinct 
entities from one another, in fact, the boundaries are often blurred. 
35An Examination of Nonprofit-Government Relations in the U.S.34 An Overview of the Nonprofit-Government Relationship 
For example, the governing boards of some nonprofit community de­
velopment agencies have members appointed by government officials, 
and many state universities and public libraries incorporate private 
fundraising associations or foundations within their structures. To a 
certain extent, such hybrids can be understood as forms of govern­
ment-nonprofit collaboration vis-a-vis the complementary view of 
nonprofit-government relations. More generally, however, we abstract 
from some of the messy detail of the real world in the following 
discussion and proceed under the assumption that government­
nonprofit boundaries can be recognized without undue difficulty in 
most instances. 
In the same vein, we note that the three analytical views developed 
here all derive essentially from rational choice models in the econom­
ics tradition. Other schools of thought (e.g., behavioral and sociologi­
cal theory) also contribute much to the understanding of institutional 
relationships such as those between government and nonprofit~orga­
nizations, as well as to an appreciation of the limitations of the eco­
nomic approach (see Powell and DiMaggio 1991, chapter 1, for an 
excellent discussion of these issues). 
Nonprofits as Supplements to Government 
The thesis that nonprofit organizations provide collective goods on a 
voluntary basis was first advanced by Burton Weisbrod in his seminal 
work on government failure (Weisbrod 1977). The basic premise is 
that citizens have individual preferences about the levels, qualities, 
and types of public goods they desire and how much they are willing 
to pay for them. Governments decide on the level of public goods 
provision based on citizens' preferences and are constrained by con­
siderations of equity and bureaucratic procedure to tax and to offer 
levels of public good in a uniform way (Douglas 1987J. Given demo­
cratic voting and policymaking procedures, governments follow pref­
erences of the median voter or of a dominant political coalition 
(Buchanan and Tullock 1962) in choosing those uniform tax rates and 
levels, types, and qualities of services. If citizen preferences are not 
homogeneous, some citizens (e.g., those whose preferences vary sub­
stantially from those of the median voterJ will be left unsatisfied, 
either paying for and receiving more (of various types of) public goods 
than they want, or paying less and receiving less than they want. 
Citizens in the latter group are presumed willing to provide additional 
levels of public good by mobilizing on a voluntary collective basis 
through the nonprofit sector. 
Weisbrod (1977J points out that nonprofits are not the only solution 
to the problem of public goods provision where the preferences of the 
citizenry are heterogeneous. Various private market substitutes for 
public goods may be purchased by citizens instead (e.g., guard dogs 
to supplement public policing). Moreover, where multiple local polit­
ical jurisdictions exist, as they do in the United States, people may 
move to communities where tax rates and public goods levels best 
match their preferences (Tiebout 1956). These solutions, however, all 
have their limitations. Exercising mobility is costly. Political jurisdic­
tions package multiple public goods together so that citizens cannot 
make perfect matches between communities and personal preferences 
for services and taxes. And private goods are usually imperfect sub­
stitutes for public goods. Hence, substantial room is left for nonprofits 
to fill the role of supplementer of government services. 
In light of this theory, we can expect substantial variation in non­
profit sector-government relationships among fields of activity. In 
areas such as the arts where citizen preferences vary widely, private 
nonprofit provision can be expected to be substantial. In areas such 
as policing and defense where preferences may be relatively homo­
geneous, we can expect the nonprofit role to be less substantial. In 
areas such as social services, where citizens' preferences can be vol­
atile, we can expect nonprofit provision to respond to ebbs and flows 
of public sentiment and consensus. 
The supplementary model also suggests an interesting dynamic 
when people's preferences change over time. In particular, public de­
cisions to expand the role of government in areas traditionally served 
by nonprofits can be viewed as a threat by the latter. Commenting on 
government activism in the 1960s, for example, Bremner (1988) notes: 
To some observers government intrusion into areas formerly the pre­
serve of voluntary activity comprised a more serious threat to philan­
thropy than internal rivalries (184). 
Alternatively, however, the supplementary view also illuminates the 
notion that private action is often actually intended to prod govern­
ment into action. For example, the Ford Foundation's Public Affairs 
Program in the 1960s funded "demonstration" programs "addressing 
education and delinquency in the slums and mobilizing the electoral 
strength of minority communities" (Bremner 1988, 187). 
Nonprofits and Government as Complements 
Lester Salamon (1995) has been the principal advocate for the view 
that nonprofits and government are engaged primarily in a partner­
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ship or contractual relationship in which government finances public 
services and nonprofits deliver them. Aspects of both economic theory 
of public goods and economic theory of organizations help clarify the 
rationale behind this thesis. First, the theory of collective action as 
advanced by Mancur Olson (1965) highlights the phenomenon of "free 
riding," when people attempt to provide collective goods on a volun­
tary basis. Where the good to be provided is "nonrival" (Le., can be 
consumed by one party without reducing the amount available to 
others) and "nonexcludable" (Le., the good cannot be made available 
to one party without making it simultaneously available to others), 
then people have the incentive to avoid contributing to its provision 
but to consume it once it is provided by others. As a result, such 
goods will not be provided at efficient levels through voluntary col­
lective effort. The problem of free riding is exacerbated where groups 
are large and relatively homogeneous in their preferences (so that no 
one party is tempted to provide the good on its own). Solutions to the 
public goods problem include social pressure (e.g., appealing to con­
science, peer-to-peer solicitations, etc.), tying together of private in­
centives with public goods support (e.g., bonuses given to members 
of public radio stations), and coercion (e.g., using the police power of 
the state to collect taxes). It is the latter solution that suggests that 
government should undertake to finance public goods, either directly 
or through tax incentives, while not necessarily becoming the vehicle 
for their delivery. 
Economic theory of organizations, specifically several aspects of 
the theory of the firm and transactions-cost theory, help illuminate 
why, in many instances, it may be more efficient for government to 
delegate delivery of services to private organizations (e.g., nonprofits) 
than to deliver those services itself. Coase (1988) addresses the ques­
tion of why a business firm, for example, would choose to carry out a 
marginal transaction through the market rather than internally. For 
example, why might a firm contract out for a particular task rather 
than hire or direct its current employees to do it? One part of Coase's 
explanation is that as an organization gets larger, the costs of admin­
istering additional transactions, such as enlarging the bureaucracy, 
rise. At some point it becomes cheaper to contract outside rather than 
expand work internally, i.e., there are "diminishing returns to man­
agement" as well as possible differences in direct production costs 
inside versus outside the organization. Such an explanation appears 
relevant to government provision of public services. Complaints about 
the cost and inefficiencies of public bureaucracies are common. De­
spite the costs of arranging and monitoring external contracts (see 
Gronbjerg 1997), it may be cheaper for governments to contract out for 
certain services than perform them internally. In addition, labor costs 
may be lower in the private sector if the latter is not unionized, and 
private suppliers may be better able to exploit economies of scale for 
certain services by producing them for more than one jurisdiction. 
(See Ferris 1993 for a comprehensive discussion of government's de­
cision to contract out.) 
It is not clear that governments always try to minimize their pro­
duction costs (see Niskanen 1971 for one explanation of why they 
presumably do not). Assuming that they do sometimes try to reduce 
costs, however, the Coase argument helps explain why governments 
sometimes contract for service delivery with private suppliers. This 
explanation does not distinguish between nonprofit and for-profit 
contractors, however. Some additional considerations apply to this 
issue. Another aspect of transactions-cost theory pertains to the in­
formation an organization requires in order to carry out a market 
transaction efficiently. In the case of public services, two aspects re­
lated to the quality of services delivered appear relevant. First, gov­
ernment may choose to contract out, not only because it is cheaper 
but also because it may be unable to differentiate its services in re­
sponse to the heterogeneous preferences of its citizens. There would 
be too much information to gather in order to do so. By contracting 
with nonprofits that are knowledgeable about the individual com­
munities in which they are based, however, government can overcome 
the information problem and, within limits, allow those delivery 
agents to customize their services to local constituents. 
To a certain extent, such differentiation would be possible if gov­
ernment contracted with for-profit businesses as well, so long as those 
businesses were community-based or conscientious about monitoring 
the preferences of their customers. Without its own data, however, 
how could government verify such responsiveness? Here is where 
another aspect of the transaction-cost literature comes into play in 
favor of nonprofits. Nonprofits operate under different incentives than 
for-profits. In particular, they do not face the same imperatives to 
skimp on quality, renege on promised service parameters, or lower 
the costs of production by homogenizing services in order to increase 
profits (see discussion of contract failure, below). Hence, government 
presumably faces lower monitoring and contract enforcement costs 
associated with ensuring differentiated, responsive community ser­
vices, by contracting with nonprofits rather than with for-profits. 
Steinberg (1997) points out that the arguments for nonprofits as less 
costly contractors for government are subject to a number of caveats 
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and subtleties associated with donor reactions to government financ­
ing, the internal motives of nonprofit agents, the level of competition, 
and the structure of the contracts themselves. Nonetheless he con­
cludes that: 
Non-profit organisations deserve some preference in bidding because 
they provide benefits to the government (reduced opportunistic behav­
ior and reduced transaction costs of negotiating, monitoring and en­
forcing a contract) that cannot be enforceably written into a contract 
with for-profits (Steinberg 1997, 176). 
In all, the theory of public goods coupled with the theory of trans­
actions costs provides a plausible explanation for why government 
and nonprofits often engage in a complementary relationship in which 
government finances and nonprofits deliver services. This relation­
ship is more likely to be observed in areas such as social services 
where free riding is a significant problem. where direct public pro­
duction is likely to require a large bureaucratic operation, and where 
differences in local preferences favor some differentiation of services 
to alternative locales and consumer groups. 
Finally, a curious but historically important variation of govern­
ment-nonprofit complementary relationships occurs where the gov­
ernment and nonprofit-sector roles are reversed in terms of financing 
and service delivery. Interestingly, there are many instances through­
out U.S. history where government has been the recipient of private 
largesse for the purpose of carrying out public projects such as the 
care of public monuments (see below). A theoretical explanation of 
such behavior seems more consistent with the supplementary than 
complementary view but with a slight twist: Private parties raise 
funds for activities that would not be supported by public demand. 
Moreover, the private givers find it more efficient, given the costs of 
private supply, to "contract" with government for their production 
rather than produce the goods themselves. (This would occur, for 
example, where the projects represent marginal additions to public­
sector operations and where private supply would have to start from 
scratch.) Additionally, the public values these activities, accepts im­
plementation within the public domain, and may even contribute 
something to their financing. In this sense, private financing of gov­
ernmental projects needs to be understood through both the supple­
mentary and complementary lenses. 
Nonprofits and Government as Adversaries 
To date, the advocacy role of nonprofit organizations in public policy 
and the role of government in controlling nonprofit organizations have 
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not been explicitly addressed by economic theories of nonprofit or­
ganizations. To a certain extent, nonprofit advocacy and government 
pressure on nonprofits can be understood through the complementary 
lens of nonprofit-government relations. Often, nonprofits and govern­
ment are collaborators in passing legislation or changing public atti­
tudes. Similarly, government sometimes encourages, prods. and 
stimulates private, voluntary activity in support of social goals (see 
below). But advocacy activity suggests that there is also a third way 
of characterizing the relationship between nonprofit organizations 
and government-as adversaries in policymaking and service delivery. 
Again, however, bits and pieces of economic theory help to illumi­
nate the adversarial relationship. On the issue of nonprofit advocacy, 
Weisbrod's (1977) theory of government failure is again helpful. In 
heterogeneous communities, where minority views are not well re­
flected in public policy, minorities will organize themselves on a vol­
untary collective basis, not only to provide public services for 
themselves but also to press government to more adequately serve 
their interests. In the basic Weisbrod model, government would have 
no incentive to respond since it simply follows the preferences of the 
majority. More nuanced analyses of public choice, however, which 
allow for logrolling, vote trading, and concentration of minority efforts 
on particular issues, demonstrate that organized minorities can be 
effective in having their public policy concerns addressed (Buchanan 
and Thllock 1962). Such minorities mobilize themselves through 
voluntary associations or interest groupS, becoming an important 
component of the government-nonprofit sector constellation of rela­
tionships.
The Weisbrod model is also helpful for understanding how new 
public services come into being through advocacy. Proposals for new 
programs will at first be favored only by a minority of voters and 
hence not immediately adopted by government. A minority of citizens 
may promote the idea through advocacy and demonstrate its efficacy 
with voluntary contributions. Nonprofit "think tanks" may playa role 
in such efforts {Hall 1994} or, as noted above, foundations may fund 
"demonstration projects" {Bremner 1991}. Such promotional efforts 
may be successful in securing pilot funding from government. Even­
tually the concept may be proven and receive the support of a major­
ity, at which point government may undertake full-scale provision. 
Economic theory is also helpful for understanding why government 
is motivated to oversee nonprofit organization behavior and perfor­
mance and sometimes to press nonprofit organizations to change. In 
particular, the theory of contract failure first developed by Henry 
Hansmann (1980) postulates that nonprofit organizations are chosen 
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as efficient vehicles for delivering services where there is a condition 
of "information asymmetry" between consumers and producers that 
would allow a profit-making fum to exploit consumer ignorance to its 
advantage. Nonprofits are seen to be more efficient in this circum­
stance because the nondistribution constraint (which precludes the 
distribution of "profits" to those who control the organization), as 
Hansmann argues, or the internal governance structure of nonprofit 
organizations, as Ben-Ner (1986) suggests, reduces the incentives and 
opportunities for nonprofits to cheat consumers; this makes them 
more "trustworthy." 
Why then, if nonprofits are more trustworthy, does government need 
to regulate them? Two reasons are implicit in the theory of contract 
failure. First, the trustworthiness of nonprofit organizations depends 
in part on the credibility of the nondistribution constraint and the 
integrity of the nonprofit governance structure. These, in turn, must 
be policed, and that is government's role. Government must ensure 
that the nondistribution constraint is indeed observed (Young 1983) 
and that appropriate principles are followed for constituting governing 
boards, to ensure nonprofits' trustworthiness. 
Second, contract failure may be seen as a broad phenomenon sub­
ject to a variety of approaches and solutions, including licensure, 
accreditation, competition, and other means. Utilization of nonprofits 
is one weapon in the arsenal-and not necessarily a perfect or com­
plete solution to the problem. Nonprofits also violate the trust put in 
them on occasion, and some of the same oversight mechanisms that 
government uses to oversee for-profit providers in various markets can 
be applied to nonprofits as well. 
Finally, it is interesting to return to Weisbrod's (1977) model in the 
context of the nonprofit advocacy role and explore its implications for 
government behavior. If nonprofits advocate for minority positions in 
the policy arena, it follows that government may react by trying to 
defend majority interests. One form that reaction may take is at­
tempted restriction of nonprofit advocacy. In the guise of regulation, 
government can become the adversary of nonprofits in the policy 
arena. Recent deliberations over the Istook amendment, which pro­
posed to curtail advocacy by nonprofits receiving any federal funds, 
or the various deliberations leading to the restrictions on foundations 
in the 1969 Tax Act (Bremner 1991; Hall 1994] may be partially under­
stood in that light. 
Finally, it is worth observing that nonprofits and government may 
oppose one another for the simple reason that these parties indepen­
dently pursue objects whose impacts are felt differently by the two 
An Examination of Nonprofit-Government Relations in the U.S. 
parties. For example, public-sector initiatives to reduce taxes and sim­
plify the tax code, although not intended to harm nonprofits, have the 
effect of doing so. In such instances, the actions of the government 
reflect Weisbrod's model of public-sector decisionmaking in which 
the majority approves what it sees as a public good, and minority 
(nonprofit] interests are forced to oppose what they view to be a public 
bad. 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 
The supplementary, complementary, and adversarial theories, taken as 
a cluster, themselves bear witness to the overall complexity of non­
profit-government relationships. These are not mutually exclusive 
ways of understanding those relationships but rather overlapping 
models that each capture important elements of reality. History may 
be examined in layers by asking sequentially: What do each of the 
models reveal about the nature of government-nonprofit relationships 
as they have evolved in the United States? 
We proceed by reviewing, through each of the three theoretical 
lenses, the history of the nonprofit sector in the United States at 
various stages-colonial times, the early republic, post-Civil War,late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, and modern times-as doc­
umented by several contemporary nonprofit-sector scholars. History 
is examined here in a necessarily cursory fashion through secondary 
and tertiary sources. This approach does not do justice to the work of 
serious nonprofit historians, but it does suggest the utility of the 
proposed theoretical framework in probing for a comprehensive un­
derstanding of government-nonprofit relations and how they are 
changing over time. Hopefully it partially addresses Hall's (1992) 
complaint: 
The shortcomings of the social sciences have stemmed primarily from 
their ahistoricity and their tendency to fragment and thereby distort the 
continuum of collective action (109-110). 
Finally, it must be acknowledged that the very concept of nonprofit 
as a sector is a modern construct that we must impose somewhat 
awkwardly to analyze earlier historical periods. Like the blurring of 
the boundaries between sectors in the modern era, this ambiguity of 
institutional definitions requires a certain amount of license in mak­
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ing observations on the essence of historical fact using the crude 
instruments at hand. 
History through the Supplementary Lens 
On one level, the relative roles of government and nonprofit organi­
zations in the United States may be appreciated by examining how 
nonprofits have attended to collective needs left unaddressed by 
government: 
Americans had a long experience in founding voluntary agencies to 
perform tasks which individuals could not accomplish alone and 
which public bodies, for one reason or another, were not able to under­
take [Bremner 1988, 176). 
While documentation is spotty, it is clear that nonprofit activity 
supplementary to government predates the U.S. republic. A review by 
Lohmann (1992) suggests that colonists brought with them religion­
based traditions of mutual aid: 
Scottish immigrants to Boston formed the first ethnic mutual aid soci­
ety in 1657, initiating a trend that continues today for virtually every 
ethnic, racial, or nationality group.... A French religious order 
founded the first American orphanage in New Orleans in 1718.... Res­
idents of Williamsburg, Virginia and Philadelphia founded early men­
tal hospitals (121). 
Lohmann goes on to note that: 
New England Puritans, Virginia planters, and Dutch colonists in New 
York and New Jersey all adopted church-based relief committees as the 
basis of colonial welfare systems. Only gradually did the New England 
Puritan towns move to civil welfare administration. Although religious 
voluntary associations date from the earliest settlement of New Eng­
land, more secular associations of charitable and mutual aid societies, 
fire brigades, lodges, and professional societies emerged later, mainly 
in Boston (122). 
O'Neill (1989) emphasizes the point that religion dominated what we 
now think of as the nonprofit sector in colonial times and the early 
period of the republic: 
... religion was by far the most important part of what would come to 
be known as the nonprofit sector. Arts and culture organizations were 
nonexistent, health care was primitive and family based, formal educa­
tion was far less extensive than it is now, social services were minimal, 
and somewhat frowned upon, and there was nothing even vaguely re-
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sembling grant making or international assistance organizations. As far 
as the incipient nonprofit sector went, religion was virtually the only 
game in town (25). 
Interestingly, while religion and government were sometimes inter­
twined during the colonial period, specifically in New England and 
the South, O'Neill argues that the diversity of religious beliefs in the 
colonies ultimately made necessary the separation of church and state, 
hence reinforcing the development of the nonprofit sector as supple­
mentary to government: 
What started to emerge almost immediately in the English colonies 
was the notion that allegiance to one country, culture, language and 
tradition could coexist with sharp diversity in religious ideas and prac­
tices ... the English colonists simply had to deal with the fact of reli­
gious diversity; the economic, political, social, and military realities of 
the New World left them no choice. It was principally this variety of 
religious experience in colonial New England that prepared the way for 
religious liberty. That idea and reality, in turn, played a critical role in 
the development of the American third sector, since organized religion 
not only was a major part of the sector but also spawned much of the 
rest. Without religious diversity and state neutrality toward religion, 
the American nonprofit experience would have been very different (26­
27). 
Bremner (1988) notes that in the early period of the republic, private 
initiative in higher education was a particularly important area of 
nonprofit activity as a supplement to government: 
The field of higher education, neglected by the federal government and 
very poorly supported by the states, gave philanthropists their greatest 
opportunity for service. A nation growing rapidly in population and 
wealth possibly needed more colleges than the twenty-odd in existence 
at the start of the century (48). 
O'Neill (1989) describes one of many examples where privately 
based initiatives ultimately led to adoption by government in the first 
half of the nineteenth century: 
In 1813 ... Quakers founded the first private psychiatric hospital in 
the United States With a revolutionary set of practices, the Quak­
ers released the insane from their chains, gave each a private room 
with a window, allowed them to walk around the wooded grounds and 
work in the hospital gardens, and made caring conversation the basis 
of treatment. When the State Lunatic Hospital at Harrisburg was 
opened in 1851, the Pennsylvania General Assembly declared that the 
quality of care should be the highest and should be based on the 
Quaker model (72-73). 
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In both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the traditions of 
self-help, both religious and secular but largely separate from govern­
ment, continued to be very important: 
Most nineteenth century U.S. residents immigrated from cultures with 
broad repertoires of associational and common practices.... Cultur­
ally, these immigrants were already armed with many organizational 
skills.... From the start these skills were used in organizing fire com­
panies, mutual aid societies, local governments, and an array of other 
associations.... During much of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, fraternal organizations serving both civic and quasi-religious 
functions were an important means of social integration for the middle 
and lower classes, particularly in predominantly rural areas (Lohmann 
1992,123). 
Bremner (1988) observes that "The twenty-five or thirty years after 
the Civil War seemed, to Americans living at the time, an era of 
stunning achievement in all fields of philanthropy" (85). Nielsen 
(1979) claims that the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was 
the period in which private initiative peaked in its prominence: 
... in the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first decades 
of the twentieth century, many Third Sector institutions-in addition 
to the churches-developed private sources of support and simultane­
ously an ideology of separateness which affected the policies of both 
private agencies and government (14). 
The surge of private, nonprofit initiative supplemental to govern­
ment in this period was fueled by a combination of new and enormous 
private, concentrated industrial wealth and political progressivism 
stemming from industrialization, urbanization, and immigration. Ac­
cording to Hall (1992): 
... the use of private nonprofit organizations grew enormously in the 
last decades of the nineteenth century. Big business and private wealth 
underwrote the growth of universities, libraries, hospitals, museums, 
social-welfare organizations, professional societies, and private clubs. 
At the same time, the middle and lower classes supported labor 
unions, mutual-benefit societies, fraternal organizations, volunteer fire 
companies, building and loan associations, and even cooperatively 
owned nonprofit businesses. Growing awareness of urban poverty 
among the middle and upper classes encouraged the establishment of 
charitable organizations of every sort, ranging from traditional funds 
for the relief of the sick, poor, and disabled to new forms of nonprofit 
activity, such as settlement houses and charity organizations.... No 
less important than the private organizations directed to the reform of 
society was the rise of new kinds of cultural organizations whose pri-
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mary constituencies were the rich. The establishment and professional­
ization of museums and symphony orchestras ... played a major role 
in recasting the nature of urban culture (39). 
Andrew Carnegie's Gospel of Wealth was influential in this period 
and supportive of the concept of philanthropy as a substitute for 
government programming: 
According to the gospel of wealth, philanthropy was less the handmaid 
of social reform than a substitute for it. Wise administration of wealth 
was an antidote for radical proposals for redistributing property and a 
method of reconciling the poor and the rich (Bremner 1988, 102). 
The role of women was especially important in creating voluntary 
associations that addressed social needs in this era of weak govern­
ment: 
While wealthy businessmen such as John D. Rockefeller and Andrew 
Carnegie lavished massive donations on growing crops of foundations, 
universities, museums, and think tanks created in the corporate image 
of their business ventures, women-even very wealthy women-con­
tinued to build their own organizations through an economy of time, 
rather than cash ... [These] voluntary associations were unusually in­
fluential in weak governmental systems, such as that of the United 
States in this era ... (McCarthy 1997, 145-146). 
Of great long-term significance in this period was the invention of 
the modern foundation, which institutionalized the ability of private 
interests to fund nonprofit-sector activity in a focused manner: 
... credit for establishing the first foundation of the modern type-an 
open-ended endowment devoted "to the good of mankind," which car­
ried out its charitable purposes by giving money to institutions rather 
than operating them, and which entrusted decision making to staffs of 
experts ... went ... to Margaret Olivia Slocum Sage, the widow of 
Wall Street buccaneer Russell Sage.... Mrs. Sage decided to establish 
a philanthropic trust "elastic in form and method to work in different 
ways at different times" for "the permanent improvement of social con­
ditions" (Hall 1992, 47). 
As Hall notes, the Russell Sage Foundation was followed by the major 
foundation initiatives of Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller, and 
other industrial giants. Those initiatives were but one aspect of a 
broader strategy of "welfare capitalism" that allowed private initiative 
and wealth to underwrite a variety of programs supplemental to gov­
ernment's own efforts: 
Sometimes welfare capitalism involved direct corporate subsidies of
 
charitable organizations, as with the massive support by the railroad
 
46 An Overview of the Nonprofit-Government Relationship 
industry of the Young Men's Christian Association (Y.M.C.A.).... 
Companies also contributed to the creation of parks and playgrounds, 
schools, and libraries ... (50). 
Other institutional innovations, including the community foundation 
and the community chest, also emanated from the era of business and 
private social activism in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
as means to coordinate the development and allocation of private 
resources to community needs (Hall 1992, 51). 
While much of the twentieth century witnessed the growing role of 
government in the provision of public services of all varieties, supple­
mental provision by nonprofit-sector institutions has persisted and 
indeed grown. Early in the depression of the 1930s, for example, Pres­
ident Hoover perhaps unduly emphasized charity as a substitute for 
potential government relief. Partially as a consequence of this expe­
rience, charity fell into some public disrepute between the 1930s and 
the 1960s (Bremner 1988). But measurements made since then (in the 
1980s) of the size and scope of the sector reveal the substantial char­
acter and continued growth of churches, foundations, trade and 
professional associations, and other subsectors that support them­
selves without government help and that provide collective goods 
essentially supplemental to that of the government sector. Indeed, the 
number of foundations has continued to grow over the course of the 
century, along with the real value of assets they hold and the alloca­
tions they dispense (Hodgkinson and Weitzman 1996). Moreover, the 
measured part of the supplemental nonprofit sector may indeed rep­
resent only a fraction of the total picture. If David Horton Smith 
(1997a) is correct, existing quantitative research has missed a sub­
stantial fraction of the grassroots organizations that provide great mag­
nitudes of self-help, communal, relief, and other services, essentially 
on a volunteer basis without significant exchange of funds, and sup­
plemental to government. These organizations trace back even further 
than formalized nonprofit organizations and have been part of the 
American scene since the beginning (Smith 1997b). 
Finally, the end of the twentieth century may be witness to a re­
surgence of the supplemental model, not just in the United States but 
internationally. Weisbrod (1997) notes: 
. . . the growing importance of nonprofits everywhere, as population
 
migration and the flow of information through television and com­

puters have the effect of magnifyiilg diversity in country after coun­

try.... This growing diversity of societies is bringing, everywhere,
 
retrenchment of government and increased reliance on the nonprofit
 
sector (542-543).
 
An Examination of Nonprofit-Government Relations in the U.S. 47 
The supplementary lens identifies an important component of the 
history of nonprofit sector-government relations in the United States. 
In various contexts, private citizens, rich as well as those of limited 
means, have often provided for themselves and for others. In some 
cases, such activity is supplemental to existing government provision; 
in other cases, the nonprofit sector creates and supports new forms 
of collective activity not previously undertaken by government. His­
tory shows as well that such activity is undertaken by minorities, 
including ethnic and religious groups, as well as by business leaders 
with their own social preferences and agendas, different from the 
political majority, in a manner that appears consistent with the sup­
plemental theory of voluntary collective action. 
Some scholars argue, however, that the supplemental mode of non­
profit-government relations is not the dominant stream. For example, 
Hall (1992) claims that voluntary associations were relatively sparse 
and subservient to government in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. And Nielsen (1979) considers the period of private-sector 
vigor in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to have been 
an aberration from the more pervasive mode of nonprofit sector­
government interpenetration. Thus, the supplementary lens gives only 
a partial view, and we need to take another look through the comple­
mentary lens. 
History through the Complementary Lens 
Several scholars, including Hall (1992), Nielsen (1979), Bremner 
(1991), McCarthy (undated, 1997), and Salamon (1987), have observed 
that governmental partnerships with private philanthropy and non­
profit organizations have been a part of the American scene from 
colonial times. No less prominent a figure than Benjamin Franklin 
was a proponent of public/private collaboration: 
His political talents were never better displayed than in his ability to 
unite public and private support behind municipal improvements. He 
played a leading part in the establishment of both the Pennsylvania 
Hospital (1751) and the academy which became the University of Penn­
sylvania (Bremner 1988, 17-18). 
The case of Harvard University is often cited as the earliest example 
of public support and nonprofit provision: 
The situation of Harvard College, the oldest eleemosynary corporation 
in the colonies, illustrates well the anomalous status of all colonial cor­
porations. Although chartered as a corporation, the college was gov­
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erned by boards composed of ministers of the tax supported 
Congregational church and government officials sitting ex officio. Al­
though Harvard possessed a small endowment, given partly by benevo­
lent colonists and partly by British friends, it was regarded as a public 
institution because most of its revenues came from legislative grants 
and from tuitions and fees (Hall 1992, 16-17). 
Parallel situations characterized Yale vis-a-vis the state of Connecticut 
(Salamon 1987) and Williams College (Massachusetts), Columbia 
(New York), and the University of Pennsylvania (Nielsen 1979). 
Similar arrangements were found in the health and social services 
in colonial and postrevolutionary times: 
Early hospitals such as Pennsylvania Hospital, founded in 1752, of­
fered health care for indigent patients with their expenses paid by local 
or colonial governments. Private institutions for the mentally ill such 
as the Hartford (Ct.) Retreat and McLean Hospital in Boston used state 
and local government funds to provide care for indigent mentally ill 
patients (Smith and Lipsky 1993, 47). 
Governmental involvement and financial support of private, non­
profit organizations providing higher education, hospital care, and 
social services, begun in the early republic, continued unabated 
through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For example, Nielsen 
(1979) cites Massachusetts General Hospital, Louisville General Hos­
pital, University Hospital in Baltimore, and Natchez Charity Hospital 
as examples of private, nonprofit institutions established or supported 
with state government funds in the years between 1820 and 1840. 
McCarthy (undated) documents similar activity in the arts after the 
civil war. And Salamon (1987) observes that toward the end of the 
nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, government sup­
port of hospitals and nonprofit social service organizations was fairly 
common: 
A survey of seventeen major private hospitals in 1889 revealed that 
12 to 13 percent of their income came from government [and] ... a 
1901 survey of government subsidization of private charities found that 
"except possibly two territories and four western states, there is proba­
bly not a state in the union where some aid [to private charities] is not 
given either by the state or by counties and cities" (100, 101). 
Observers seem to agree, however, that governmental support of non­
profit organizations did not become extensive until the mid-twentieth 
century. According to Smith and Lipsky (1993): 
... government funding of private service organizations was not exten­
sive by today's standards. A 1914 survey revealed that "22 states made 
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no appropriations whatever to privately managed charities, fifteen
 
make such appropriations sparingly, and nine place no apparent re­

strictions on their grants" (49).
 
In the 1930s, however, the federal Works Progress Administration pro­
moted an especially important example of government-nonprofit col­
laboration in the arts, helping important institutions such as 
Chicago's Art Institute, the Cincinnati Museum, and New York's Met­
ropolitan Museum survive financially: 
Although Federal One and the Treasury arts program are the most fa­
miliar examples of Depression Era government patronage, the influence 
of the WPA extended to local cultural institutions as well, adding a 
new slant to the practice of third party government. ... By 1933, the 
[Metropolitan] Museum's investment income was diminishing as well, 
generating salary cuts. By 1936, however, staff costs were being offset 
by workers seconded from the WPA. Clerical staff, carpenters, painters, 
masons, lecturers, even guards were provided with support from the 
public till (McCarthy, undated, 18-19). 
Government-nonprofit collaboration picked up Some lost steam in 
the 1960s. The public/private partnership in public service, never dis­
solved but in abeyance during and for some years after the New Deal, 
took on new life in the 1960s and 1970s (Bremner 1988, 210). And 
Salamon, writing in 1987, observed that "although government sup­
port of the voluntary sector has deep historical roots in this country 
... this support has grown considerably in scope and depth over the 
past thirty years" (101). 
The magnitude and scope of governmental support and contracting 
with nonprofits began to grow dramatically in the 1960s because of 
expansion in federal programs. For example: 
Federal expenditures for social welfare services almost tripled between 
1965 and 1970.... The federal role continued to expand throughout the 
1970s.... A big percentage of the increase in public funding of social 
services was expended through nonprofit agencies.... Faced with pub­
lic pressure to expand social services, particularly for the poor, Con­
gress enacted the 1967 Amendments to the Social Security Act. ... 
which specifically encouraged states to enter into purchase-of-service 
agreements with private agencies.... A 1971 study indicated that 25 
percent of state spending on social services was for purchased ser­
vices.... By 1976 this expenditure had risen to 49% (Smith and Lip­
sky 1993, 55). 
In addition, in 1961, the establishment of the Combined Federal Cam­
paign allowed certain charities to solicit charitable contributions from 
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federal employees (Bremner 1988. chapter 13). Nor was the experience 
of expanded government financial support for nonprofits limited to 
the social services, In a study of 16 local communities in 1982, gov­
ernment reliance on nonprofit organizations to deliver public services 
was found to be extensive in social services. housing and community 
development. health care, and the arts. In each of these fields, more 
than 40 percent of government expenditures were allocated to private. 
nonprofit organizations (Salamon 1987). In the arts, the creation of 
the National Endowment was a particularly important element in the 
developing public/private partnership: 
According to Senator Claiborne Pell, who helped to draft the enabling 
legislation, the notion of using the Endowment "as a catalyst ... [to] 
help spark nonfederal support ... was the key to the entire proposal." 
With the creation of the NEA, the notion of public/private partnerships 
emerged full blown (McCarthy, undated, 32). 
International relief was another area where public support of non­
profit efforts became important: 
The engines of cooperation between public and private sector efforts in 
overseas aid were the Food for Peace Program, originating in 1954, and 
the Agency for International Development (AID), founded in 1961 ... 
people to people groups such as Catholic Relief, CARE, Church World 
Service, and the American Joint Distribution Committee distributed 70 
percent of the donations.... In addition to supplying surplus commod­
ities, mostly food, the government paid the overseas freight costs of 
clothing, medicine, and other material purchased by or given to volun­
tary agencies by their members (Bremner 1988, 196-7). 
While the expansion of contractual arrangements between govern­
ment and nonprofits was dramatic in the 1960s and 1970s, Bremner 
(1988) stresses its continuity with earlier periods in American history: 
In some respects purchase of service agreements marked a return, al­
though on a much larger scale, of the nineteenth-century practice of 
granting subsidies from public funds to private orphanages, hospitals, 
and relief societies. Had advocates or critics of privatization chosen to 
do so they might have cited examples in earlier periods of American 
history when towns, counties, and states delegated responsibility for 
the care of the poor and criminals to private contractors (202). 
The reverse model of private financing and public provision has 
also appeared throughout U.S. history. In the early republic, for ex­
ample, Stephen Girard made bequests to the city of Philadelphia for 
improvement of certain streets and to the state of Pennsylvania for the 
development of canals (Bremner 1988. 39). Later examples include 
James Smithson's gift to the federal government for what became the 
Smithsonian Institution, Andrew Mellon's gift of the National Gallery, 
and Andrew Carnegie's gifts of public libraries to many communities 
(Bremner 1988). This tradition is also reflected in various voluntary 
campaigns to raise charitable funds for government monuments, in­
cluding the building of the Washington Monument and the refurbish­
ing of the Statue of Liberty; foundations' contributions to fund drives 
during and after World Wars I and II; the establishment of the Sanitary 
Commission during the Civil War to improve conditions in military 
camps; and various other organized voluntary efforts to financially 
assist government in wartime from revolutionary times to the present 
era (Bremner 1988). Indeed, the tradition continues unabated: 
Private givers further supported their part of the public-private part­
nership by contributing to mainly tax-supported institutions such as 
state colleges and universities, public radio and television stations, and 
public or endowed museums, libraries, parks and zoos. Nearly every 
public educational, civic, or cultural institution cultivated "Friends" 
whose gifts supplemented appropriations from federal, state, or local 
government. In New York City in 1987 twenty public monuments in 
need of costly repair were put up for "adoption" by private donors; in 
Washington, nc., the National Park Service, operating on a tight 
budget, asked private individuals to donate money to replace aging and 
dying cherry trees around the Tidal Basin (Bremner 1988. 211). 
Finally, the complementary relationships of government and non­
profits extend to more subtle instances where government has acted 
as an encourager and cheerleader of nonprofit-seCtor efforts. In the 
early years of the depression, for example, President Hoover "enlisted 
the services of one hundred leaders of business, industry, finance and 
philanthropy" in the "task of mobilizing and coordinating the chari­
table resources of the country" (Bremner 1988, 139). National admin­
istrations exerted similar efforts during wartime, and in the 1990s we 
have witnessed such efforts as the Points of Light program and the 
President's Summit aimed at stimulating volunteerism and engaging 
business in the solution of social issues. 
The early 1980s was a high-water mark in the partnership between 
government and nonprofit organizations in the delivery of public 
services. at least in terms of funding. Beginning in the Reagan admin­
istration, however, policy initiatives shifted toward cutbacks in gov­
ernment funding and encouragement of private organizations to take 
up the slack not only in terms of service delivery but resource support 
as well. Still, funded partnership arrangements between government 
and nonprofits persist and even continue to be the norm. With the 
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acceleration of federal devolution in the 1990s, however, much de­
pends on the propensity of state and local governments to compensate 
for federal budget cuts and exploit the flexibility of new block-granting 
arrangements to expand and diversify contracting with private pro­
viders. That prospect is by no means certain: 
The federal money machine is turned off. This is not just a fiscal event. 
It shifts the social policy agenda to others-mainly to state govern­
ments-when it comes to defining social needs, determining how to 
meet them, and deciding who should have the responsibility for doing 
so. Nonprofit organizations have every reason to be very nervous about 
these budget reductions (Nathan 1996, 49). 
The complementary lens reveals a very different overlay of non­
profit-government relations than does the supplementary lens. 
Through the complementary lens we see one sector engaging the other 
in order to get the public's business done together. At various times 
and places in American history, private philanthropy has been a sup­
portive force, helping government with financing to get its work done. 
More generally, government has been the driver, looking to nonprofits 
as means of delivering mainstream public services under mandates of 
public policy. That orientation was particularly apparent in the post­
World War II period when the federal government allocated massive 
new funding for social services, health care, education, and the arts 
but largely resisted the creation or expansion of new government 
bureaucracies to deliver those services. In terms of theory, the trans­
actions and production costs associated with contracting with or sub­
sidizing existing nonprofits, as well as creating many new nonprofit 
organizations, were apparently more reasonable than those associated 
with administering a greatly expanded governmental delivery system. 
While efficacious for government, the partnership model, under 
which government finances and nonprofits deliver the services, may 
have looked more ominous for nonprofits. As noted, this mode of 
government-nonprofit relations clearly gained prominence in the 
1960s and 1970s. And it would appear that nonprofits could hardly 
have resisted its momentum. Given mandates for expanded public 
services and facing internal fiscal problems, many nonprofits had the 
choice of joining the parade or being swept aside: 
As demands for social services burgeoned with the mobilization and 
social ferment in American cities in the 1960s, traditional agencies ex­
perienced pressures from within and without to expand their activi­
ties Federal funding ... pushed up revenues throughout the 
sector The growth of government funding clearly bailed out many 
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financially troubled traditional agencies.... With these public funds 
agencies enter into a new relationship to government. Agencies which 
for decades had relied on private contributions or small government 
subsidies were now primarily dependent on government funds.... The 
traditional agencies had now become instrumentalities of government 
funding, expanding beyond niches supported by private funds (Smith 
and Lipsky 1993, 58-60). 
History through the AdversariaI Lens 
As nonprofit organizations became more dependent on government 
funding in the 1960s and 1970s, the nature of the relationship between 
government and nonprofits changed in other ways as well: 
Historically, government purchased services from charitable organiza­
tions and attached few strings beyond those common to many other 
service purchasers. Today governments contract for whole programs, 
and even create providers where they otherwise do not exist. There is 
more contracting today than ever before, and the terms of contracting 
are more demanding. If in the past government went to the private sec­
tor for limited services, today its purchasing power is such that it is 
often in a position to shape the sorts of services offered by private pro­
viders (Smith and Lipsky, 9-10). 
Thus, public funding has been accompanied by greater governmental 
control and regulation of nonprofits. Some of this regulation derived
•from failures similar to those that occur in the profitmaking market­
place: 
During the 1950s standards of care in some of the traditional service
 
areas started to come under criticism ... for example ... systems of
 
adoption placement dependent upon sectarian community agen­
cies.... Social welfare advocates attacked the larger traditional agen­
cies for neglecting the needs of the poor and racial and ethnic 
minorities. Meanwhile, government officials exerted greater regulatory 
oversight over private social programs, especially on public safety and 
staffing issues (Smith and Lipsky, 53). 
Another form of reaction took place in the arts, where government 
officials sought to censor artistic endeavor and restrict funding for 
controversial projects: 
Questions of censorship, state control, and ideology surrounded the de­
mise of the Federal Writers and Theater Projects in the 1930s, only to 
reemerge in more vitriolic form at century's end.... Led by Senator 
Jesse Helms, conservatives balked at what they deemed the use of pub­
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lie monies to display works that they considered obscene (McCarthy, 
undated,43-44). 
While government oversight, regulation, and control of nonprofit­
sector services grew considerably in the mid- and late twentieth cen­
tury in the United States, those functions, too, have long historical 
roots. The earliest manifestations of government control of nonprofits 
predate the republic and center on the debate concerning the very 
existence of nonprofits as corporate entities. In colonial times, the 
status of nonprofits was unclear. Recall that Harvard College was 
governed by boards composed of ministers and government officials 
(Hall 1992, 16-17). In the early days of the republic, government­
nonprofit relations differed by state, depending on the state's position 
on the issue of incorporation of private organizations: 
In the South, a forcefully expressed body of anticorporate doctrine be­
gan to emerge, largely under the tutelage of Thomas Jefferson. Although 
favoring the freedom of individuals to associate for common purposes, 
Jefferson worried that such groups, if incorporated and empowered to 
hold property, would become the basis for new kinds of tyranny ... he 
believed that all (organizations]-governmental and nongovernmen­
tal-should be restricted in their powers and privileges (Hall, 22-23). 
A crucial turning point was the Dartmouth College case, which: 
... involved New Hampshire's efforts to take over Dartmouth College. 
When Jeffersonians took control of the legislature in 1816, they reorga­
nized the college, changed its name, and replaced its twelve-member 
self-perpetuating board with twenty-one gubernatorially appointed 
trustees and a board of twenty-five legislatively appointed overseers, 
who enjoyed veto power over the trustees. The president of the college 
was required to report annually to the governor on its management, 
and the governor and his council were empowered to inspect the col­
lege every five years and report on its condition to the legislature (Hall, 
28-29). 
Dartmouth College ultimately won its case in the Supreme Court in 
1818, on the grounds that the college's charter constituted a contract 
between trustees and donors that could not be violated without con­
travening the Constitution. This set the precedent that has allowed 
nonprofit corporations in the United States to maintain their corpo­
rate integrity without threat of arbitrary governmental intervention. 
Still, government regulation of nonprofits continued to evolve. For 
example, at the time of the Civil War, the U.S. Freedmen's Bureau 
attempted to discourage duplication in the efforts of voluntary socie­
ties devoted to the needs of freed slaves. Around the same period, 
several states established state charity boards "to inspect, report 
upon, and make recommendations for improving public welfare in­
stitutions and such private ones as received state assistance" (Brem­
ner 1988, 91). 
National emergencies sometimes required unusually heavy control 
of nonprofits by government. Just prior to World War II, the Neutrality 
Act of 1939 required "voluntary agencies which wished to engage in 
civilian war relief in belligerent countries to register with and submit 
monthly reports to the Department of State" (Bremner 1988, 158). And 
during World War II, the Roosevelt administration established the War 
Relief Control Board: 
The board now had the power to control all solicitations for voluntary 
war relief.... It had power to license and withdraw licenses from war 
relief agencies and, in the interest of economy and efficiency, to elimi­
nate or merge organizations. The board scheduled the various national 
fund appeals and prevented competing campaigns during the periods 
set aside for the Red Cross National War Fund, United Jewish Appeal, 
and War Bond drives. The staff of the Control Board sharply scruti­
nized overhead costs and made reasonable economy of operation a re­
quirement for continued licensing (Bremner 1988, 159-160). 
In the 1970s, charitable solicitation gained prominence as an issue 
for state and local governmental regulation: 
Just as conduct of foundations had seemed to require corrections in the 
1960s so, in the 1970s, according to many state and local officials, the 
activities of charities that solicited money from the public needed to be 
brought under closer scrutiny. By the end of the decade twenty states 
and numerous county and local governments had adopted laws or ordi­
nances limiting charity solicitations to organizations that could prove a 
sizable proportion of the collection went for charitable purposes rather 
than for salaries and administrative costs (Bremner 1988, 190). 
As Bremner hints in the above quotation, perhaps the most vocif­
erous efforts at government regulation of nonprofits have been those 
directed toward foundations. Here the issue has been the concentra­
tion of private power under nonprofit auspices, and the public influ­
ence of that power. These concerns were apparent in the Jeffersonian 
era and became prominent again in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries with the blossoming of the large industrial enter­
prises and the concentration of private wealth in the large foundations 
of Carnegie, Rockefeller, Ford, and others. It was no secret that these 
institutions intended to influence public affairs: 
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The new foundations, particularly Russell Sage and Rockefeller, were 
unusual for not only the broad discretion granted their trustees but 
also their explicit goals of reforming social, economic, and political 
life. These lofty ends were to be achieved not by direct political action, 
but by studying conditions, making findings available to influential cit­
izens, and mobilizing public opinion to bring about change. This rela­
tionship between academic experts, influential private parties, and 
government would become the paradigm of a new kind of political pro­
cess-one based on policy rather than politics (Hall 1992, 48). 
Although concerns about the power of foundations were expressed 
in the 1930s and 1940s, the issue intensified in the 1950s: 
In April 1952, the Select (Cox) Committee for the House of Representa­
tives began an investigation of "educational and philanthropic founda­
tions and other comparable organizations which are exempt from 
federal taxation to determine whether they are using their resources for 
the purposes for which they were established ... (Hall 1992, 68). 
This began a series of congressional inquiries into foundations, pick­
ing up steam in the 1960s when foundations such as Field, Ford, and 
others were becoming particularly active on social issues such as 
voter registration, school decentralization, and urban poverty. Ulti­
mately, the 1969 Tax Reform Act put new restrictions on foundations 
and other tax-exempt organizations: 
The 1969 Tax Reform Act created a large number of new regulations for 
private foundations, mainly aimed at keeping foundations out of poli­
tics, preventing them from controlling large business interests, and 
making them more open and accountable (O'Neill 1989, 146). 
Governmental efforts on restricting foundations can be seen as part 
of a wider effort by government to limit advocacy by nonprofit orga­
nizations. As Simon (1987) notes: 
The federal tax code limits the channels through which nonprofits can 
participate in public affairs activities, here defined as "those activities 
which seek to study, criticize, inform people about, and modify the 
actions of government at all levels" (90). 
In the 1990s, conservatives in Congress made several attempts to pass 
the Istook amendment, which would ban lobbying by any nonprofit 
organization receiving federal funding. This issue, too, has a histori­
cal pedigree. As Bremner (1988) recounts: 
Rules against lobbying by tax-exempt organizations ... went back to 
1934 and had been reiterated in 1954 and strengthened in 1969. Efforts 
at relaxation of the rules began in the latter year when the American 
Bar Association ... charged that the neutrality of the tax laws with 
respect to lobbying had been upset in favor of business interests 
against charitable organizations.... In addition to the fairness issue 
advocates of relaxation questioned the constitutionality of the restric­
tions and charged the Nixon administration used IRS audits to harass 
groups that criticized or opposed its policies (194). 
Indeed, during the 1970s the pressure from government to suppress 
advocacy cut a broad swath, extended to grant-making: 
During the Nixon administration the tax-exempt status of civil rights, 
welfare rights, environmental, and antiwar groups, and public interest 
law firms received censorious attention from the Internal Revenue Ser­
vice. In 1974 Alan Pifer, president of the Carnegie Corporation of New 
York, called the situation "paradoxical": foundations were advised they 
could engage in activities bearing on public policy development but 
given to understand that it would be unwise to do so (Bremner 1988, 
191). 
Nor was the Nixon administration the last in pressing to restrict non­
profit advocacy prior to the 1990s. In the 1980s, for instance, the 
Reagan administration worked to exclude advocacy organizations 
from the Combined Federal Campaign (Bremner 1988). 
It appears that, through various regulations and restrictions, gov­
ernment has attempted to restrict the activities of nonprofits and hold 
them accountable to the public. Reciprocal efforts by private interests, 
through the ongoing formation and development of voluntary associ­
ations, have served to hold government to account, to influence the 
direction of public policy, and ultimately to protect the nonprofit 
sector itself from government attack. Hall (1992) provides a summary 
of Tocqueville's observations in the early nineteenth century: 
Tocqueville ... view[ed] private voluntarism ... as a fundamental part 
of a national power system.... At its core there was, as he observed, 
"a natural and perhaps a necessary connection" between the civil as­
sociations and the political associations through which citizens com­
bined to influence the state. And this connection was of no small 
significance. First, it was the basis for organizing political opposition 
to the power of elected officials.... Second, this connection was the 
basis for formulating the conceptual agenda on which political opposi­
tion necessarily had to be based. Tocqueville's belief that the ability of 
an organized political opposition to diminish the moral authority of 
the majority came not from its numerical strength, but from the pecul­
iar relation of political and civil associations, through which "those 
arguments that are most fitted to act on the majority" are discovered in 
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the hope of ultimately "drawing over the majority to their own side,
 
and then controlling the supreme power in its name" (85-86).
 
O'Neill (1989) ties these developments back to religious diversity in 
the colonies and early republic, leading to the first amendment to the 
Constitution as a fundamental pillar of the nonprofit sector in its 
advocacy role: 
... the First Amendment, which deals with freedom of religion, free­
dom of speech, freedom of assembly, and the right to petition govern­
ment over grievances, can without exaggeration be seen as the Magna 
Carta of the nonprofit sector in American life. These First Amendment 
freedoms guarantee not only to individuals but also to groups the right 
to assemble, speak out, and proclaim values and beliefs. The indepen­
dence of the independent sector finds its strongest legal support in the 
First Amendment, including its religious liberty clause (30). 
Since colonial times social reformers have been active in pushing 
government to take action or institute programs in such areas as 
prison reform, help for the poor and homeless, care of neglected chil­
dren, opposition to slavery and assistance to freedmen, and improve­
ment of schools. Such activity has extended to the improvement of 
governance itself. In the context of the settlement house movement of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Bremner (1988) ob­
serves a host of voluntary associations were at work or organizing to 
strengthen the social framework of democracy and to restore and 
extend the principles of self-government (109). Women's movements 
have been a very important strand of public policy advocacy: 
A growing number of scholars have set about to analyze the connec­
tions between activism of women's groups and government policy in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.... They have 
stressed the relationship between women's voluntary associations and 
the creation of social services and political programs that in the United 
States culminated in the New Deal and the welfare state.... Women's 
efforts to establish playgrounds, libraries, and public health programs 
and their activism in state and local government contributed to the de­
velopment of federal programs like Social Security and Aid to Depen­
dent Children.... Their voluntary associations constituted a link 
between grassroots women's groups and those women who gained na­
tional power and recognition, for example, Frances Perkins, the first 
female cabinet member. These women were able to build on small, lo­
cal issues to lay the groundwork for the campaigns for social justice 
that ultimately shaped national policy (Robertson 1998, 193). 
An Examination of Nonprofit-Government Relations in the U.S. 59 
Overall, social action movements, manifested largely though vol­
untary organizations, have been aimed at changing public policy 
across a broad spectrum of issues: 
America from the start has been a hotbed of social, economic, reli­
gious, and political reformism.... The revolution, the Civil War, Popu­
lism, Progressivism, and the New Deal have been among the earlier 
surges. The years since World War II have seen the eruption of a com­
bination of powerful thrusts of dissent and demands for change. The 
most notable of these have been the civil rights movement, the anti­
Vietnam War movement, the student rebellion, the environmental 
movement, the consumer protection movement, the women's liberation 
movement, and the movement for greater responsiveness and accounta­
bility of institutions, both government and corporate (Nielsen 1979, 
157). 
Bremner (1988) notes that the 1970s were an exceptionally active 
period for advocacy organizations in the United States: 
The same period that saw government and voluntary service agencies 
working in closer cooperation also witnessed the rise of a great many 
advocacy organizations monitoring the performance of government and 
seeking to influence public policy by lobbying, demonstrations, litiga­
tion, and empowerment of beneficiaries of social programs (203). 
While Nielsen characterizes social movement organizations as the 
"soft" part of the nonprofit sector, he acknowledges that the boundary 
is fuzzy between this part of the sector and the highly structured 
"hard," service-oriented part of the sector: 
These distinctions are more clear in concept than in practice. Non­
profit organizations do not break neatly into two distinct segments. _. 
rather they are arranged as points along a spectrum according to the 
particular mix of service orientation and reformism which gives each 
its distinctive personality (156). 
Still, the distinction is important because in it lies a fundamental 
tension in the contemporary nonprofit-government relationship-to 
what extent should organizations that receive tax benefits or direct 
governmental support be allowed to spend that money to influence 
public policy? Despite the different tax-exemption categories (for ex­
ample, 501(c)3 versus 501(c)4), the virtual impossibility of segment­
ing nonprofits neatly into those that do and do not attempt to influence 
public policy promulgates a tension between government and non­
profits that continues unabated to the present day. 
60 61 An Overview of the Nonprofit-Government Relationship 
Interestingly, the blurring of nonprofit categories in the public policy 
dimension is mirrored by blurring in the commercial sphere as well, 
and this, too, has ramifications for the adversarial relationship with 
government. Looking toward the end of the twentieth century and the 
beginning of the next millennium, Weisbrod (1997) predicts: 
... that the increased fiscal pressure on nonprofits will lead them to 
generate new, more creative forms of commercial activities, and that 
these new forms will further blur the distinctions between nonprofit 
organizations and private firms. In the process, [ expect reconsidera­
tion of many existing public policies regarding nonprofits: their subsi­
dization and restrictions on their freedom to lobby government; to 
engage in joint ventures with private firms; and to compete with pri­
vate firms. [ also expect increased pressure from government to require 
nonprofits to disclose more publicly their compensation of executives, 
and I anticipate the applicability of antitrust laws to nonprofits to 
emerge as a political issue (547). 
The congressional attack on foundations of the 1950s and 1960s 
galvanized foundations and other parts of the sector into unprece­
dented collective action, first through exercises of self-study via the 
Peterson and Filer Commissions, and ultimately to the organization 
of Independent Sector, a comprehensive umbrella organization de­
signed to increase public understanding about the sector and to ad­
vocate for its interests at the national level. Thus, instead of continuing 
to present itself in a fragmentary manner, the sector would for the first 
time have a vehicle to speak as one vis-a.-vis government in addressing 
public policy that affects nonprofit organizations. That voice has been 
used subsequently to address major national policy initiatives of the 
1980s and 1990s affecting the welfare of the sector, including the 
Reagan budget cuts; the federal budget cuts proposed in connection 
with the Contract with America (U.S. Congress 1995); changes in the 
tax code such as above-the-line deductibility of contributions by non­
itemizers, the proposed flat tax, and reductions in tax rates that would 
reduce incentives to give; and the issue of intermediate sanctions for 
disciplining nonprofits in violation of federal law, as well as the very 
question of restrictions on lobbying by nonprofit organizations. 
Governments have severely challenged nonprofits at the state and 
local level in recent years as well, especially in connection with prop­
erty tax exemptions. In the 1990s challenges to property tax exemp­
tions have been pursued in many states, including Colorado, Maine, 
New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Wiscon­
sin (Salamon 1997). Mirroring its efforts at the national level, the 
nonprofit sector has also begun to mobilize at the state and local 
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levels, especially through state associations of nonprofit organiza­
tions, which now exist in three dozen states. In the new environment 
of devolution, these associations are intended to give the nonprofit 
sector a stronger voice in the local policy process, especially in state 
capitols. The free-rider tendencies that characterize the large and di­
verse nonprofit sectors at the state and local levels hamper efforts to 
mobilize these state associations. Federal devolution initiatives may, 
however, ultimately prove to be the same kind of catalyst for organiz­
ing nonprofits at the state level in the 1990s that congressional attacks 
on foundations in the 1960s were for galvanizing collective action by 
the sector at the national level. 
THE CHANGING SOCIAL CONTRACT 
The foregoing discussion suggests that, while each conceptual lens 
offers substantial insight in every period, different views of the non­
profit sector-government relationship have prevailed at different 
times in U.S. history. The adversarial lens is especially helpful in 
understanding the early republic, when public and private spheres of 
autonomy were first being sorted out, and the mid- to late twentieth­
century period, when government sought to redress the balance of 
power of government and private interests. The supplementary lens 
helps especially to illuminate the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, when private interests asserted themselves in providing for 
social needs. The complementary lens is particularly useful in ex­
plaining the post-World War II era, when government sought to ad­
dress social needs without unduly expanding its own bureaucracy. 
In each of these periods, there appears to have been an implicit, 
though dynamic, understanding of the relative roles of government, 
business, and the nonprofit sector in addressing the overall needs of 
society. Before the period of rapid industrial growth, the "social con­
tract" consisted of a division of responsibilities between very modest 
government efforts to provide for social needs and multiple, autono­
mous private efforts. With massive changes following the Civil War, 
including industrialization and immigration, the private sector­
through new social welfare associations and underwriting of various 
forms of welfare capitalism by the business sector-assumed new 
levels of responsibility for collective needs. In the mid-twentieth cen­
tury, an American version of the welfare state emerged, with govern­
ment, partnered with nonprofit organizations, providing for public 
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needs not only in human services but extending to the arts, education, 
health, the environment, and other fields. While there is substantial 
variation among areas of public service activity, these chronological 
patterns are remarkably similar from field to field over the past three 
centUIies (O'Neill 1989). There is nothing permanent, however, about 
the pattern of intersector relations from era to era: 
Relations between responsibilities assigned the three sectors are nei­
ther rigidly defined nor permanently fixed but shift from time to time 
to meet changing circumstances and needs (Bremner 1991, 216). 
The present era of the 1980s and 1990s is manifesting another sea 
change in which the social contract is implicitly being rewritten. Seen 
through the three lenses of government-nonprofit relations, however, 
the new contract appears to be substantially incomplete. One princi­
pal emphasis appears again to be most visible through the supple­
mentary lens, where government is seen as taking a relatively passive, 
fiscally conservative role in public service provision, and the private, 
nonprofit sector is expected to move to the fore with new levels of 
charitable funding and volunteering. Unlike the turn-of-the-century 
period 100 years ago, however, which also witnessed the rapid growth 
of new industrial enterprise and amassing of private wealth, it is not 
clear what contemporary economic engines are able or willing to 
power new private initiatives of requisite strength. Certainly there are 
impressive new industrial enterprises now, especially in the technol­
ogy and communications areas, but these are embedded in a highly 
competitive international economy that leads them to downsize and 
shed employees rather than take care of them. And while there have 
been massive gifts by corporate titans such as George Soros and Ted 
Thrner, these have been isolated instances; corporate philanthropy 
generally is becoming more of an exercise in strategic marketing and 
employee morale-building than corporate social responsibility (Bur­
lingame and Young 1996). Certainly there is massive new private in­
dividual and corporate wealth, but tax reform policy initiatives, such 
as tax simplification and lowering of tax rates, threaten to undermine 
rather than strengthen incentives for charitable giving (Steinberg 
1996). Additionally, concerns about "unfair competition" voiced by 
the business sector and more general anxieties about corruption of 
nonprofits as a consequence of their involvement in market enterprises 
may eventually limit the ever-increasing dependence of nonprofit or­
ganizations on commercial sources of income (Weisbrod 1998). 
The complementary lens reveals an arena in which government­
nonprofit partnerships could evolve very differently. The numbers and 
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variety of arrangements through which government and nonprofits 
collaborate are no doubt increasing-as government seeks ways of 
squeezing more out of its limited resource base-but such collabo­
ration could no longer be the main event if government. at least at the 
federal level and possibly at all levels, removes itself from bottom-line 
financial responsibility for providing public services. 
Viewed through the adversariallens, the changing social contract 
is even more in flux. While extolling the virtues of private, charitable 
initiative, many legislators seem more willing now both to challenge 
the tax exemptions of nonprofit organizations and to limit the voice 
of nonprofits in the policy arena. Thus, while reducing its own re­
source commitments to social needs, government appears also to be 
hampering the ability of nonprofits to function successfully, both in 
raising their own resources and in speaking out for those who may be 
ill-served under a new regime of limited government responsibility. 
While the current changes derive from various political agendas as 
well as economic forces, the incompleteness of the pending new social 
contract may be more a matter of inattention than illintenUon. Ex­
amination of the contemporary scene through the three lenses reveals 
gaps and inconsistencies that need to be brought to consciousness 
and resolved through some holistic concept of what the new contract 
ought to be. What are the roles of nonprofits and government, abso­
lutely and in relation to one another, and what is the social role of 
business and private wealth? If nonprofits are to assume new levels 
of public responsibility, how can resources be mobilized for them to 
do so? How can they do so if government limits tax incentives to give, 
questions the legitimacy of nonprofit commercial enterprise, and sup­
presses nonprofits, voice in the public policy arena? And if private 
wealth is to drive new levels of voluntary initiative, how can that 
wealth be mobilized? In particular, how can businesses and individ­
uals of means be encouraged to contribute at a level that compensates 
for governmental withdrawal? Or will we live in a society in which 
great inequalities of wealth and welfare persist and grow, and social 
problems fester without amelioration or resolution? 
Nonprofit organizations appear to be caught in the middle of this 
perplexing uncertainty over the pending social contract. Contempo­
rary government policy toward the nonprofit sector is inconsistent, at 
once encouraging the growth of voluntarism and private initiative and 
at the same time limiting its resource base. And the role of the econ­
omy's largest and arguably most important sector-business-re­
mains anomalous, again largely due to the absence of an overall 
concept of the social contract underlying public policy. On the one 
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hand, business is reducing its explicitly philanthropic efforts. In ad­
dition, segments of the business community object to expansion of 
nonprofits into commercial arenas, while other parts of the business 
sector expand into areas of health care, social services, and education 
lhat once were more exclusive domains of nonprofit activity. On the 
olher hand, businesses have discovered partnerships with nonprofits 
as a lucrative marketing strategy, and employee voluntarism as an 
efficient means of building morale and maintaining good relations in 
the communities where they are located. Overall, however, the social 
role of business remains in flux and is not clearly articulated as part 
of an overall consensual social arrangement. 
Benjamin Franklin was a great social reformer who was driven by 
his own holistic concepts of society applicable to the times: 
Self-reform through voluntary mutual-benefit associations led before 
long to voluntary associations directed to public benefit. These would 
eventually include subscription libraries, volunteer fire companies, a 
hospital, and an academy, the latter of which received charters of in­
corporation from the Pennsylvania legislature (Hall 1992, 19). 
Franklin also invented bifocals. He knew how important it was to use 
appropriate lenses in order to see things clearly at different distances. 
For government-nonprofit relations and the issue of the social con­
tract, Franklin might have prescribed trifocals. We need all three 
conceptual lenses-supplementary, complementary, and adversar­
ial-to bring the issues into full view and proper focus. 
Note 
I would like to thank Elizabeth Boris, Eugene Steuerle, Robert Wuthnow, Kathleen 
McCarthy, Waldemar Nielsen, Robert Bremner, Richard Steinberg, and Stuart Mendel 
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